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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
DANNY RICHARDS, 
Defendant -Appel lan t . 
Case No. 20580 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
1. Does the trial court have the authority to give an 
indigent criminal defendant credit for presentence confinement in 
a misdemeanor case? 
2. If the trial court does have the authority to give 
an indigent criminal defendant credit for presentence confinement 
in a misdemeanor casef must the court give such a credit when it 
imposes the maximum sentence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny Richards , was charged wi th aggravated 
a s s a u l t , a t h i r d degree fe lony , under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 
(1978) (R. 2 1 ) . On February 28 , 1985, he p led g u i l t y t o t h e 
charge of s imple a s s a u l t , a c l a s s B misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-102 (1978) (R. 3 6 - 7 ) . On March 8, 1985, t h e t r i a l 
cour t sentenced defendant t o t h e maximum term of s i x months i n 
t h e S a l t Lake County J a i l wi th no c r e d i t for confinement p r i o r t o 
the da te of d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t y p l ea (R. 51 ) . Defendant appea l s 
t o t h i s Court from t h a t s e n t e n c e . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The f a c t s p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s appeal a r e as f o l l o w s . 
Having been a r r e s t e d i n December 1984 and charged with aggrava ted 
a s s a u l t ^ a t h i r d degree f e l o n y , defendant p led g u i l t y t o t h e 
l e s s e r charge of s imple a s s a u l t , a c l a s s B misdemeanor, on 
February 2 8 , 1985 (R. 3 , 2 1 , 3 6 - 7 ) . Between t h e d a t e of h i s 
a r r e s t and the da te of h i s g u i l t y p lea defendant was unable t o 
pos t b a i l . 1 The t r i a l c o u r t sentenced defendant t o t h e maximum 
term of s i x months i n the county j a i l fo r a c l a s s B misdemeanor 
and re fused t o g ive him c r e d i t for confinement p r i o r t o e n t r y of 
h i s g u i l t y p lea (R. 5 1 ) . Subsequent ly , defendant f i l e d a motion 
i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e q u e s t i n g t h a t he be given c r e d i t for t h a t 
pe r iod of d e t e n t i o n on the ground t h a t he was i n d i g e n t and could 
not pos t b a i l (R. 5 6 - 7 , 68 -156) . This motion was denied (R. 
67A). Upon a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s Court , defendant ob ta ined a 
c e r t i f i c a t e of p robab le cause (Addendum). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Because the au thor i ty to grant c r ed i t for presentence 
confinement t o an indigent defendant in criminal cases l i e s 
exclusively with the Board of Pardons, defendant 's request for 
such a c red i t should not have been made to the t r i a l court , but 
rather to the Board. 
1
 The record does not spec i f i ca l ly ind ica te tha t defendant never 
posted any of the various ba i l s e t t i ngs of $2,500, $10,000, and 
$50,000 (R. 3 , 4 , 6, 13, 15) . Nor i s there anything in the 
record to ind ica te the reason tha t defendant did not post b a i l . 
However, there i s no reason to d isbel ieve appel la te counsel ' s 
representa t ion that defendant never posted ba i l due to his 
indigency. Throughout the criminal proceeding, defendant was 
represented by appointed counsel which i s avai lable only to 
indigent defendants (R. 4 , 9, 10, 24, 30, 34) . 
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A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o 
g i v e t h e r e q u e s t e d c r e d i t , i t e r r e d i n n o t c r e d i t i n g d e f e n d a n t , 
who was i n d i g e n t and r e c e i v e d t h e maximum s e n t e n c e , w i t h t i m e 
s p e n t i n p r e s e n t e n c e d e t e n t i o n . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE 
CONFINEMENT TO AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT IN A 
MISDEMEANOR CASE LIES EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS; ALTERNATIVELY, I F THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO GIVE SUCH A 
CREDIT, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING 
DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR PART OF HIS PRESENTENCE 
DETENTION. 
Defendan t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t 
imposed t h e maximum s e n t e n c e of s i x months upon him f o r h i s c l a s s 
B misdemeanor c o n v i c t i o n , s e e UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 4 ( 2 ) 
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 2 and r e f u s e d t o g i v e him c r e d i t f o r t h e c o n f i n e m e n t he 
s u f f e r e d p r i o r t o t h e d a t e h e e n t e r e d h i s g u i l t y p l e a . Defendan t 
c o n t e n d s t h a t , b e c a u s e he was i n d i g e n t and t h e r e f o r e u n a b l e t o 
p o s t b a i l d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d , t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o g i v e him 
c r e d i t amounted t o a v i o l a t i o n of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of 
e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n and t o be f r e e from m u l t i p l e p u n i s h m e n t . 
T h i s a p p e a l r a i s e s two i s s u e s : (1) when a misdemeanor 
s e n t e n c e i s imposed , does a t r i a l c o u r t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o 
S e c t i o n 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 4 ( 2 ) p r o v i d e s : 
A p e r s o n who h a s been c o n v i c t e d of a 
misdemeanor may be s e n t e n c e d t o i m p r i s o n m e n t 
a s f o l l o w s : 
. . . 
(2) In the case of a c lass B 
misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding s ix 
months!.] 
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give credit to an indigent criminal defendant for presentence 
confinement or does that authority rest exclusively with the 
Board of Pardons? and (2) if the t r i a l court does have the 
authority to give such a credit , did the court err in refusing to 
grant credit in defendant's case? Each of these issues will be 
addressed separately below. 
A. 
Initially, it must be determined whether a trial court 
has the power to give an indigent defendant credit for 
presentence confinement in a misdemeanor case. Article VII, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in part: 
Until otherwise provided by law, the 
Governor, Justices of the Supreme Court and 
Attorney General shall constitute a Board of 
Pardons, a majority of whom, including the 
Governor, upon such conditions as may be 
established by the legislature, may remit 
fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, 
and grant pardons after convictions, in all 
cases except treason and impeachments, 
subject to such regulations as may be 
provided by law, relative to the manner of 
applying for pardons; but no fine or 
forfeiture shall be remitted, and no 
commutation or pardon granted, except after a 
full hearing before the Board, in open 
session, after previous notice of the time 
and place of such hearing has been given. 
The proceedings and decisions of the Board, 
with the reasons therefor in each case, 
together with the dissent of any member who 
may disagree, shall be reduced to writing, 
and filed with all papers used upon the 
hearing, in the office of such officer as 
provided by law. 
This constitutional provision appears to place in the Board of 
Pardons exclusive authority to commute, reduce, or terminate 
sentences in "all cases except treason and impeachments," whether 
they involve felony or misdemeanor convictions. Interestingly, 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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UTAH CODE ANN, § 77-27-5(1) (Supr. 198ri» s u g g e s t tha* the Board 
w i l l only eonyhloi LPI 'M oases ; t h e r e i s DO mention of 
misdemeanor cases . That sec t ion s td le i j 111 iu i i 
(1) The Board of Pardons shal l 
determine by majority dec i s ion when and unuv. 
what condi t ions , subject t o the provis ions c: 
t h i s chapter and other laws of the s t a t e , 
persons serving sentences i n a l l felony
 t : -
except treason or impeachment, or as 
otherwise l imi ted by law, may be re leased 
upon parole , pardoned, r e s t i t u t i o n ordered, 
or have t h e i r f i n e s , f o r f e i t u r e s , or 
r e s t i t u t i o n remitted, or the i r s en tences 
commuted or terminated. No r e s t i t u t i o n may 
be ordered, no f i n e , f o r f e i t u r e , or 
r e s t i t u t i o n remitted, no parole , pardon, or 
commutation granted or sentence terminated, 
except af ter a f u l l hearing before the board 
or i t s appointed examiner in open se s s ion and 
after appropriate prior n o t i c e of the time 
and place of the hearing has been given t o 
the defendant, county attorney, sentencing 
court, v i c t im, whenever p o s s i b l e , and law 
enforcement o f f i c i a l s responsible for the 
defendant's a r r e s t and convic t ion . 
In j r a c t i ^ e . * ne b -ar- considers only felony ^ b ( 
misdem* x—; ; .-. t o t he t r i a l co-_ .:.y reduc t ion in 
sentence. 
An issue very s i m i l a r to t h e one p resen ted heie w.u.i 
addressed b2 in i , , «Vi i M> S la t s y, Schreuderr '.'-r» iH;ah Ail- , 'h« 
2 ; 1985). There, aftei sen tenc ing thr lof on ur * fc - I 
ii- ^ i v. rmi nat •- tern" of f i v e yea r s t o 1 if o f<r second degrt =, . r ;• : 
and a d d i t i o n a l conse* ut ivc Ivmir. of one year an-i z^:o t ; , -
y e a r s for use of a f i r ea rm, the defendant ie<|ae '- - ar. the 
11 i ii oonn »n ik i uiiuii 1'iedit be qiven tor the per iod of H™^ hp 
spent in p i e t r i a i deieio j >n, lu <• , Hoiinq t h a t defendant 
"haldl not suggested in h i s brief the source oi an/ auth"Tjiv for 
a t r i a l :\>\n\ \ ut . ^hat i s iu e f f e c t a luodi f ica t ion of a 
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s t a tu to ry sentence ," the Court concluded t h a t the t r i a l court did 
not have t h i s au thor i ty and tha t defendant 's request should be 
d i rec ted to the Board of Pardons, with which "the power to reduce 
or terminate sentences i s exclusive . . . . " Xjfcid. This 
ana lys i s i s equally appl icable to the defendant convicted of a 
misdemeanor. 
That the felony sentencing s t a t u t e s e t s forth 
indeterminate sentences, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1985),3 
and the misdemeanor sentencing s t a t u t e appears to provide only 
maximum terms up to which the court may se t a determinate 
sentence, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (1978),4 should be of l i t t l e 
consequence. A misdemeanor sentence imposed under § 76-3-204 
should r e f l ec t a j u s t punishment for the p a r t i c u l a r defendant 
based upon the circumstances of the crime and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of the defendant. By plugging the question of c red i t for 
presentence detent ion in to the equation, sentencing decis ions may 
become skewed. JS££ Godbold v . Wilson, 518 F.Supp. 1265, 1269 
(D.C. Colo. 1981) (recognizing t ha t a sentencing judge could 
circumvent a defendant 's cons t i tu t iona l r igh t to c red i t for 
presentence confinement by imposing a correspondingly longer 
sentence before giving c r e d i t ) . These policy considera t ions , 
Section 76-3-203 s t a t e s in per t inent p a r t : 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as fol lows: 
4
 In p r ac t i c e , t r i a l cour ts sentence misdemeanants to de f in i t e 
terms of inca rce ra t ion . They do not , for ins tance , sentence one 
convicted of a c lass B misdemeanor to an indeterminate term of 
zero to s ix months. 
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coupled with a r t i c l e • 1 i, at i J - a ". and tii^ holding of State Vt 
Schreuder, further support the conclus ion thai i he q n t n a r n < I 
credit i a ui isdernainoi" I W P is one foi th'* Board of Pardon-
Although a cotiii admi t ted ly ooui.i iiuponc u ' MUIH sentence 
vtt ion <M a credi t being given by the Boat J, Uit lo . -L 
a n a l y s i s does 
lr. - . I.:-'- d i f ferences between ihn t-dany sen tenc inq 
Ht.atnl*' i misdemeanor counterpart do a d i c t a t e that 
r educ t ion of tnisdemej: presentence confinement 
f a l l s within the province , • ! • , * . « :. - -
Boar* - , ' J i e Vi. se t i *- ; v..- i : t r e q a . i t a ; e 
same r e s u l t here as t h a t reached i SiAJLe V* fa^nreuderi 
• •- thstanding that § 7 7 - 2 7 - r U ) apparently l i m i t s the b o n d " a 
.:,*;.. . t i t y Li> l^ -iiMiy oaao Therefore , defendant's request for 
• • - e h t on h i s misdemeanor sentence shoajl d i» >! > i > 1^ ed to the 
1 Pai i a s . 
B. 
r e c the i h.^ a i r t he Court clu i des that Hi, h > 11 
court dot * - : : M enve c r e d i t for p resen tence 
confinement misdemeanor casen, !!li S l a t e a i rees with defendant 
that the b e t t e r , and perhaps m a j o i i t y , view i • tha t a ijafandant 
whose ;L<-.- rice confinement was due sol e l / to h i s indigency 
muat be credited by the sentenr a anai i im » '«e time spent in 
presentence confinement, parvi r :i. ar ly , as wa,: t h e case time whim 
a maximum ser * > • Utfii fe.^» ,.• Godbold v, Wilson. 518 
• -;.]vp. !'•> : - * •-"; - >- ); State v» Phelah 2d 
^ v^asn. il;c-.) ten han« ) ; Annot. . . . •• -d 
- 7 -
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182 (1977 and Supp. 1985) (which collects cases that indicate an 
increasing trend in this direction). In his brief defendant 
provides a complete discussion of the authority in support of the 
view that denying an indigent defendant credit for presentence 
confinement when the maximum sentence is imposed would constitute 
multiple punishment in violation of the fifth amendment's double 
jeopardy clause and an equal protection violation* That 
authority, which the State finds compelling/ need not be 
discussed again here; howeverf several additional observations 
should be made. 
Certain jurisdictions have held firm to the position 
that a defendant has no constitutional right to credit for 
presentence confinement and that such a right is only conferred 
by statute. £££, e.g.. People v. Emig, 676 P.2d 1156, 1160 
(Colo. 1984). Utah has no statute that deals with this question. 
The State and defendant agree thatf in the absence of any 
statutory right, an indigent defendant has a constitutional right 
to such a credit when the maximum sentence is imposed. Although 
the same logically should be true even when an indigent defendant 
is sentenced to less than the maximum term and the sum of the 
term imposed and the period of presentence confinement does not 
exceed the maximum term, e.g. Klimas v. State, 75 Wis.2d 244, 
248-52, 249 N.W.2d 285, 287-9 (1977); hat £££ Munden v. State, 
698 P.2d 621, 627 (Wyo. 1985), the Court need not reach that < 
question in the context of this case. Nor should its holding be 
so broad as to reach the question of whether credit for 
presentence confinement must be given to a defendant whose ( 
-8-
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conf ineme . - i n d i g e n c y and * ne s r ? t h e t i m e *ppnt 
p r e s e n t e n c e c o n f i n e m e n t -, J nposed upon 
«
ii, i — d o e : * e x c e e d t:i(- maximum a k wa; i .so: i.eiK'e .. U.fcfe 
Hedge v . S t a t e i : ( , K : *+-at-ing t h a t " t h e 
t r i a l 'udge has d i s c r e t e . - . . ^ . *. 
s e i - : i:e c u s t o d y where <urf , a s t o d y *. :. i -.. f o 
t h e d e f e n d a n t . n d i g e n c y :: i •'- s p e n t p i
 tn t h e 
s e n t e n c e does r -. excee i UK- maximum ^ v^* i: . • * ; l e n / e " " « 
short-- t * u r t h e r a i .;? m a n t o hi, kl 
thr-.r . • A msdemeanuL ^.io. . r e s e n t e n c e 
dot • . wdb iude ^ - e l y t o h i s i n d i g e n c y and v > : e . : t j i v ^ a 
maximum s e n t e n c e muk t»- i iedk*">) hv t h e s e n t e f k n g c o u r t : >: t h e 
t i m e s p e n t i n p r e s e n t e n c e d e t e n t i o n insot, ai .*.*... *
 t 
Winning S I i ) U" * - ^ : - i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s 
p r o p o s e d h o l d i n g , ;n .. • Ar ~.i'r: . t h e Cour t 
s h o u l d o r d e r t h a t d e f e n d a n t r> I ;VL , : e a * : . , . - f 
d e t e n t i o n l-»e t v i-r-r^  t h e d a t e of i ^ s a r r e s t and t h e d a t e he e i i t e r e d 
h i s g u i l ty pi e a . • ' • 
CONCLUSION 
UnuiM in1 I 'u.i , '''ii.nl i t u t i o n and t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n of 
S t a t e v , S c h r e u d e r , i a p p e a r . •«. ii t in ' k>ai«I ; 1 ' ^ Ions h a s t h e 
exel is We a u t h o r ; f * :i.-.:;t „-• c r e d i t on t h e misdemeanor 
s e n t e n c e de fe r :u - n h e r e f o r e r h i n r e q u e s t f o r c r ed i t -
was KM p r o p e r l y made • . c o u r t and i . . d i r e c t e d 
t u "f P a r d o n s . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , if .» k i k l L uoes have t h e a u t h o r i t y 
t o g i v e c r e d i t for p r e s e n t e n c e d e t e n t i c - ? r a TMI sciemeuji
 r 
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the lower court here erred in not giving defendant c red i t for h i s 
detention between the date of h i s a r r e s t and the date of h i s 
gu i l ty p lea . In the S t a t e ' s and defendant 's view, tha t c red i t 
was cons t i t u t iona l ly mandated because the presentence detention 
was due sole ly to defendant 's indigency and defendant received 
the maximum sentence for a c lass B misdemeanor. 
Respectfully submitted t h i s of February, 
1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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